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Human and minority rights map an area in which the EU’s external relations have pushed for a 
(partial) rethinking of the EU’s internal values, objectives and policies. While minority issues have 
been at the forefront of the enlargement rhetoric and are often singled out as a prime example of the 
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norms which lack a basis in EU law and do not directly translate into the acquis communautaire. The 
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Introduction
1 
Minority rights have been a prominent and paradoxical issue during the EU’s eastward enlargement. 
The first Copenhagen criterion of 1993, which spells out the political conditions of EU membership, 
enshrined ‘the respect for and protection of national minorities’ as a condition for accession, and the 
Commission has regularly monitored the compliance with this criterion. While minority issues have 
been at the forefront of the enlargement rhetoric and are often singled out as a prime example of the 
EU’s positive stabilising impact in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the EU has in fact promoted 
norms which lack a basis in EU law and do not directly translate into the acquis communautaire. 
Minority rights fall outside the EC’s and the EU’s traditional catalogue of fundamental freedoms and 
competences. The gradual development of an EU ‘rights agenda’ has stayed clear of an explicit 
endorsement of minority rights, while at best opening up indirect avenues for the discussion and 
promotion of these rights. Therefore, the first Copenhagen condition marked a significant disjuncture 
through the explicit mention of minority protection. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) entrenched, for the first time in the history of the EU, specific 
provisions on fundamental rights and a vague recognition of the requirement that the Community shall 
respect ‘national and regional diversity’ within the Member States (then Articles F TEU and 128 
TEC).
2 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
the European Court of Human Rights effectively established a link between membership of the 
Council of Europe and EU membership. While the ratification of the Convention is an explicit 
obligation for members of the Council of Europe, it is a de facto condition for EU membership. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice uses the ECHR as a privileged source and a standard when 
reviewing EU acts and Member State laws adopted for the implementation of EU law. In addition to 
the ‘burgeoning jurisprudence’ on the issue of minority rights protection in the European Court of 
Human Rights,
3 the European Parliament has performed a showcasing role for the EU, in particular 
during the early 1990s, by passing numerous resolutions on human rights and minority protection, 
thereby reinforcing the internal discourse swell on minority rights.  
The EU’s external relations provided the key momentum for the internalisation of an explicit 
commitment to human rights and a greater awareness of minority issues. Thus, human and minority 
rights map an area in which external relations have pushed for a (partial) rethinking of the EU’s 
internal values, objectives and policies. The nexus between human rights and conditionality had been 
an integral part of the EU’s external relations since the Luxembourg European Council of 1991.
4 The 
EU’s eastward enlargement increasingly blurred the distinction between the EU’s internal policy and 
external relations, and an extension of this type of normative conditionality appears to have been a 
                                                      
1   This Working Paper is based on research conducted within the framework of a Leverhulme Research Fellowship. It has 
also been supported by an LSE STICERD grant and a Jean Monnet Fellowship at the EUI. Earlier versions of this paper 
were presented at the conference ‘Minority Protection and the EU: The Way Forward’, European Academy, Bolzano, 
30-31 January 2004 and at the European Forum, Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, 15 April 2004. 
2   Article F TEU stipulated that ‘The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.’ See 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf. 
3   See Geoff Gilbert, 2002. ‘The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 24 (3), pp. 736-780. 
4   For a reminder of the limits of this human rights conditionality, see Bruno de Witte and Gabriel N. Toggenburg, 2004. 
‘Human Rights and Membership of the European Union’, in: Steve Peers and Angela Ward, (eds.), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Law Context and Policy. Oxford: Hart, pp. 61-62. For a study of the inconsistencies of EU 
conditionality towards non-CEEC third countries see Karen Smith, 2001. ‘The EU: Human Rights and Relations with 
Third Countries’, in: Karen Smith and Margot Light, (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 185-203. Gwendolyn Sasse 
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logical step in the EU’s adaptation to a new political environment. The emphasis on minority rights in 
addition to human rights, however, cannot fully be explained by this logic. It was the post-Cold War, 
post-imperial and post-communist political environment that highlighted the salience of minority 
issues and the potential for ethno-regional conflict amidst multi-facetted transition processes. A 
mixture of humanitarian, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security concerns informed the push for a greater 
internationalisation of minority rights in the early 1990s. Minority issues have a significant historical 
resonance in CEE.
5 The experience of genocide, expulsion, coercion or accommodation is intrinsic to 
the emergence and development of many of the states in the region. After 1989 most of the post-
communist countries prioritised the strengthening of central state capacity and the position of the 
titular nationality, thereby running the risk of discriminating against, alienating and politicising 
minority groups. The violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia and a number of intractable post-
Soviet conflicts as well as a perception of further conflict potential in view of sizeable minorities in 
many East European countries (in Latvia the titular nationality accounts for only 58.2% of the 
population; while countries like Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria have to accommodate politically 
organised Hungarian and Turkish minorities of 7-10%) informed the EU’s approach.  
The EU’s political conditions for accession took shape against the background of a widening pan-
European normative and institutional framework. In turn, EU conditionality has increased the visibility 
and political salience of minority issues in the CEECs and contributed. The nexus between democracy 
and human rights had always been at the core of the Council of Europe’s self-definition and membership 
criteria. The quick engagement of the Council of Europe in CEE—Hungary became a member as early 
as 1990, followed by the Czech Republic and Poland in 1991—turned it effectively into an institutional 
stepping stone towards the EU. According to the Statute of the Council of Europe, any European state 
accepting the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms qualifies for membership. 
Institutionally, these two vague conditions translate into the ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Protocol 6, which requires members to abolish the death penalty.
6 The agreements 
between the Council of Europe and a member state leave room for tailor-made commitments and 
recommendations. Both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Committee of 
Ministers monitor a member’s compliance with these accession agreements, and in a serious case of 
non-compliance a member can be requested to withdraw, or its voting rights on the Committee or in the 
Parliamentary Assembly can be temporarily suspended. In practice, however, even the suspension of 
voting rights is a rare occurrence. The EU’s first Copenhagen criterion bears the imprint of the rather 
amorphous democratic conditionality of the Council of Europe. A country’s democratic credentials had 
been a prominent point of reference, though not an explicitly formulated condition during the EU’s 
southern enlargement in the 1970s. After the EU Copenhagen criteria were formulated, but before the 
accession negotiations began, the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) of 1995 put in place a complex and legally binding pan-European 
instrument for the continuous assessment of minority issues. Thus, the democracy criterion of the 
Council of Europe was extended to include minority rights. Members (and non-members) of the 
Council of Europe can choose, however, whether or not they want to ratify the FCNM. 
The CSCE/OSCE process from 1990 onwards further enhanced this normative basis by making 
explicit the link between democracy, human rights, conflict-prevention and minority protection.
7 The 
CSCE Paris Charter of 1990 stipulated that ‘peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the 
                                                      
5   For a general history that is sensitive to the issue of minorities in Eastern Europe see R. J. Crampton, 1994. Eastern 
Europe in the Twentieth Century—and After. London: Routledge.  
6   Pamela A. Jordan, 2000. ‘Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe and Compliance 
with Human Rights Norms’, Human Rights Quarterly, 25, pp. 662-663. 
7   See Chapter 4 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
5-29 June 1990: http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.htm. The tension between advocates of a 
traditional concept of state sovereignty and those who favoured a reformulation of sovereignty to include an obligation 
of minority protection first surfaced at the CSCE Copenhagen meeting in 1990. EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for 
the promotion of that identity be created.’
8 The OSCE General Recommendations of 1996, 1998 and 
1999 subsequently attempted to refine a European standard of minority protection.
9 The EU explicitly 
adopted the CSCE norms in the context of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. Its emphasis on the 
rights of ‘peoples and minorities’ was affirmed by the EU Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on the 
Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the Declaration 
on Yugoslavia of 16 December 1991 which made recognition conditional upon, amongst other things: 
‘guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the 
commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE’.
10 While the EU borrowed the link 
between democracy and human (and later) minority rights from the Council of Europe, the 
CSCE/OSCE provided the EU with the security-based rationale or justification for minority 
protection, a combination that resonated strongly with the Member States in the early 1990s. 
In the absence of a ‘clean’ methodological take on conditionality and its presupposed causal 
effects,
11 the analysis presented in this paper will proceed in two steps. Firstly, the EU’s minority 
criterion will be ‘unpacked’ both in terms of its inherent dilemmas and the way in which the EU 
translated it into an institutional process. Where has the EU leverage been anchored and how has it been 
communicated during the accession process? A closer look at the EU’s monitoring mechanism, 
including the Commission’s Regular Reports and perceptions from within the Commission shortly 
before the Commission turnover and the dissolution of DG Enlargement,
12 highlight the scope and 
limits of EU conditionality in the area of minority rights. Secondly, this paper will locate the EU’s 
minority criterion in the domestic political context of three accession countries (Hungary, Slovakia, 
Romania): what is the balance between internal and external incentives for policy change? How 
effective has EU conditionality been? The conclusion will draw some lessons from the enlargement 
process for the post-accession period. The paper is located in the wider discussion about the ‘European 
legal space’ consisting of overlapping, interlocking and evolutionary legal and political regimes.
13 
Moreover, it is concerned with the domestic-international nexus between ‘norm-makers’ and ‘norm-
takers’ and, thus, resonates with the debate between liberal or regime theorists and constructivists. For 
the former norms constrain behaviour and facilitate cooperation among rational, self-interested actors; 
for the latter norms have constitutive effects on interests and identities. As Checkel has argued 
convincingly, constructivists tend to overpredict international normative influence, underplay the role 
of domestic agency and social context and fail to specify the diffusion mechanism by which norms are 
                                                      
8    The text cited is in the ‘Human Dimension’ section; see http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-
1999/summits/paris90e.htm#Anchor-Huma-3228  
9   See the Hague Recommendations on the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Oslo Recommendations 
on the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998), and the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation 
of National Minorities in Public Life (1999): http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/recommendations/index.php3  
10    In its first opinion, the Badinter Committee advised that the successor states to Yugoslavia must abide by ‘the 
principles and rules of international law, with particular regard for human rights and the rights of peoples and 
minorities’. For the full text see Alain Pellet, 1992. ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second 
Breadth for the Self-Determination of Peoples’; and ibid., ‘Appendix: Opinions No. 1, 2 and 3 of the Arbitration 
Committee of the International Conference on Yugoslavia’, European Journal of International Law, 3 (1), pp. 178-185. 
11   For a discussion of the methodological pitfalls in the study of conditionality, see James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and 
Claire Gordon, 2004. Europeanization and Regionalisation in Central and Eastern Europe during the EU’s Eastward 
Enlargement: The Myth of Conditionality. New York: Palgrave, ch. 1. 
12   Here the author’s interviews with 16 Commission officials (DG Enlargement, DG Justice and Home Affairs, DG 
External Relations, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Legal Service), conducted in Brussels on 12-13 January 2004 
and 19-20 February 2004 have been a valuable source.  
13   For a discussion of the concept of the ‘European legal space’ and the need to analyse the interaction between different 
European regimes, see Christopher Harding, 2000. ‘The Identity of European Law: Mapping Out the European Legal 
Space’, European Law Journal, 6 (2), pp. 128-147. Gwendolyn Sasse 
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transmitted.
14 Although it is not the aim of this paper to enter into the intricacies of this methodological 
and ideological debate, the combination of EU conditionality, the norm of minority protection and the 
context of post-communist transition make for a rich empirical testing ground for these issues.  
Minority Rights: A Challenge for Conditionality and Compliance 
Conditionality is widely seen as a primary means of ‘democracy promotion’ and ‘Europeanisation’ in 
CEE.
15 The clear incentive structure for the candidate states and the power asymmetry characterising 
the interaction between the EU and the accession countries underpin the scope for the EU to shape the 
design of structures and policy processes in the accession countries. As yet few studies have 
systematically analysed the impact of conditionality on specific policy areas or countries and 
identified a more uneven and inconsistent EU impact than generally assumed.
16 The issue of minority 
rights is a test for the very notion of conditionality. A consensus on norms and rules and their 
transmission within the EU and beyond, clear benchmarks and enforcement mechanisms ensuring 
credibility, consistency and continuity over time are at the centre of a meaningful definition of 
conditionality. The political Copenhagen criterion generally, but in particular the reference to national 
minorities, defies these basic principles of conditionality. ‘Europeanisation’ has been defined as ‘ways 
of doing things’ which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated into ‘the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.’
17 
The issue of minority rights does not easily fit these conceptual boundaries either. Put another way, 
can the EU have an impact on minority issues without an internal consensus on the norms and 
practices in this field?
18 The Treaty of Amsterdam (TEU) of 1997 illustrates the underlying ambiguity 
best: it incorporated all of the values set out by the EU in the first Copenhagen criterion in Article 6 
(1) as ‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’, 
but expressly excluded ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. That Article 6 (1) draws on the 
Copenhagen criteria is specifically alluded to in Article 49, which specifies that the principles laid out 
in Article 6 (1) are preconditions for any state applying for EU membership.
19 This inconsistency was 
addressed in a footnote in the Commission’s Regular Reports of 2002. It states that ‘the political 
criteria defined at Copenhagen have been essentially enshrined as a constitutional principle in the 
                                                      
14   Jeffrey T. Checkel, 1999. ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 43, p. 85. 
15   Karen Smith, 2001. ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’, in: Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, (eds.), 2001. 
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, International and Transnational Factors. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 31; Jan Zielonka, ‘Conclusions: Foreign Made Democracy’, ibid., p. 511. For a general discussion 
of EU conditionality, see Heather Grabbe, 2001. ‘How does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, 
Diffusion and Diversity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), pp. 1013-1031. 
16   See, for example, James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, 2004. ‘Conditionality and Compliance in the 
EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Governance’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 42 (3), pp. 523-551. 
17   C. M. Radaelli, 2000. ‘Whither Europeanization: Concept Stretching and Substantive Change’, European Integration 
online Paper (EioP), 4 (8), p. 3. 
18   Starting from a similar premise, Alexandru Grigorescu has traced the unsuccessful transmission of the democratic norm 
of transparency in CEE to the lack of resonance of this norm within the international organisations promoting it. See 
Alexandru Grigorescu, 2002. ‘European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: The Case of Transparency’, 
International Politics, 39, pp. 467-489. Despite an otherwise instructive case study, his conclusion that the transmission 
of minority protection benefits from the fact that international organisations ‘cannot truly be accused of lack of such 
tolerance because there are no actual ‘minorities’ within International Organisations’ (p. 482), remains questionable. 
19   http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.  EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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Treaty on the European Union’.
20 The wording falls short of an explicit endorsement of the minority 
criterion, but it suggests that minority protection is subsumed under Article 6 (1). 
Thus, the minority ‘condition’ posed several compliance problems during the accession process: 
firstly, it lacked a firm foundation in EU law and concise benchmarks. The practices of the current 
Member States range from elaborate constitutional and legal means for minority protection and political 
participation to constitutional unitarism and the outright denial that national minorities exist. Secondly, 
minority rights have never been an internal EU political priority. Thirdly, the question of what 
constitutes a ‘national minority’ and the nature of minority rights are deeply disputed in international 
politics and law. These dilemmas were further compounded by the fact that the first Copenhagen 
criterion had to be ‘fulfilled’ by the time the accession negotiations got underway, thereby limiting the 
EU’s subsequent leverage in the political sphere. Moreover, the minority criterion did not figure 
prominently in the EU’s pre-accession funding. PHARE has been the main instrument for the design and 
delivery of EU policy in CEE. Established as early as 1989, the programme was reoriented to address the 
accession priorities set by the EU in 1997. PHARE did not have a separate budget line for assistance in 
the policy area of minority protection, and the most closely related activity heading ‘civil society and 
democratisation’ accounted for only about one per cent of the total PHARE funds distributed.
21 
The EU’s Monitoring Exercise 
The Commission’s annual Regular Reports, following on from the Opinions of 1997 and the 
Accession Partnerships, have been the EU’s key instrument to monitor and evaluate the candidates’ 
progress towards accession.
22 The Reports have a formulaic structure, which broadly follows the 
Copenhagen criteria and thereby permits cross-country comparisons. The political Copenhagen 
criterion rests on generic concepts, such as ‘democracy’, the ‘rule of law’ and ‘the respect for and the 
protection of national minorities’, and, therefore, leaves a wide scope for interpretation. Moreover, it 
was not based on the acquis as such. The Commission had to find a different way to operationalise the 
political criteria. In the case of the minority criterion it based its monitoring exercise on a set of values 
and non-EU documents, namely the European Convention on Human Rights (which by now has 
become part of the acquis), the major OSCE documents of the early 1990s and the UN Declarations. 
Though not a source of inspiration and legitimacy at the outset of the accession process, over time the 
FCNM of 1995 became the Commission’s primary instrument for translating the minority criterion 
into practice.
23 Accordingly, the Regular Reports frequently reminded the candidate states to sign and 
ratify the FCNM—despite the fact that several EU member states, such as Belgium, France, Greece, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have not done so.  
The explicitly stated objective of the Regular Reports is to review each candidate country according 
to ‘the rate at which it is adopting the acquis.’ This stipulation, laid down by the Luxembourg Council 
                                                      
20    See, for example, Footnote 3 in the 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession, p. 18; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/bu_en.pdf 
21   See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/statistics/commit_sector.pdf  
22   For a more detailed review of the monitoring exercise, see James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, 2003. ‘Monitoring the 
Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and 
Minority Issues in Europe, 1, pp. 1-36. The bodies set up under the Europe Agreements, such as the annual meeting of 
the Association Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee provided a limited additional forum for the 
discussion of political issues (incl. minority protection). 
23   Author’s interviews with officials from the Country Desks in DG Enlargement, the Horizontal Co-Ordination Unit and 
the Legal Service, Brussels, 12-13 January 2004. The manual, which was prepared each year by the Horizontal Co-
Ordination Unit for the Country Desks in advance of the drafting of the Regular Reports, listed the FCNM as an 
explicit point of reference.  Gwendolyn Sasse 
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of December 1997,
24 equates integration with the speedy adoption of the acquis. Thus, once the 
accession negotiations began the emphasis was not on the monitoring of the broadly stated normative 
conditions of the political Copenhagen criterion. The introduction to the first Reports of 1998 states that 
it is the EU’s priority ‘to maintain the enlargement process for the countries covered in the Luxembourg 
European Council conclusions’. This wording suggests that harsh criticism was to be avoided in order 
to sustain progress along the envisaged ‘road map’. The Reports are a compendium of results 
compiled from a variety of sources, for example the candidate countries, the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE, International Financial Institutions and NGOs, as well as ‘assessments made by Member 
States’,
25 especially in the political sphere. It is difficult to measure the relative weight of these inputs 
and to assess the process by which they were filtered and evaluated, but it is clear that in the area of 
minority issues the Council of Europe and the OSCE were privileged sources of information. During 
the drafting stage, the Commission also scheduled a regular annual briefing session in Brussels with 
the Council of Europe (incl. the Chairman of Advisory Committee) and the OSCE (incl. the Director 
of the Office of the HCNM).
26 The involvement of the NGO sector in the preparation of the Reports is 
less apparent. Due to the more specific NGO agendas, the Commission had no official ‘privileged 
relations’ with any one of them, although groups like Transparency International or Human Rights 
Watch were regularly consulted. As a Commission official closely involved in the drafting process put 
it, ‘we were dependent on solid information which had to be used in a careful manner. We used as 
many different sources as possible, provided we could double-check them.’
27 Issues would rather be 
left out if ‘hard’ evidence was missing: ‘If a country had proven the Commission wrong on a single 
issue, the whole exercise would have suffered tremendously.’
28 
The whole process, including cooperation between the Country Desks in DG Enlargement and the 
relevant line DGs, was overseen by a Horizontal Co-ordination Unit within DG Enlargement (about 25 
people). Each year this Unit produced a manual listing the issues to be addressed by the Country 
Desks
29 and streamlined the draft reports in terms of substance and language in order to ensure 
consistency and comparability within and across reports. As one official pointed out, ‘there has been a 
tendency for country teams to go native, both in terms of overly positive or negative assessments. It 
was our job to maintain the balance.’
30 A colleague from the same unit detected ‘a tendency to tone 
down or neutralise the language, while not dropping issues completely’.
31 Amidst a continuous flow of 
information from different organisations, the monthly updates and a draft report from the EU 
delegations in the candidate countries, contributions by the candidate countries’ governments and the 
bullet-point reminder provided by the Horizontal Co-Ordination Unit marked the starting-point for 
each report. Over time, previous reports became a further point of reference, in particular their ‘set 
                                                      
24    European Council, Luxembourg, 12-13 December 1997, Presidency Conclusions. 
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=43659&from=&LANG=1  
25    The UK government apparently provided the most systematic contributions throughout the monitoring process; 
author’s interviews with Commission officials, DG Enlargement, 12-13 January 2004. Though not an EU-member 
Russia regularly and forcefully addressed its criticism of the rights of the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia to all 
the Member States, the Commission and the EU presidency. 
26   ‘These meetings helped us to get a flavour of the wider process we were part of’; author’s interview with a Commission 
official, formerly Horizontal Co-ordination Unit, DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004. 
27   Author’s interview with a Commission official, formerly DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004. 
28   Ibid. 
29    The check-list on minority issues in the Unit’s handbook for 2002 included the following: ratification and 
implementation of the FCNM; the situation of the Roma, ethnic Russians and other minorities; citizenship legislation, 
rate of naturalisation, stateless children, non-citizens’ passports; active policies to integrate minorities; language 
legislation/language training programmes; professional restrictions; minority rights ombudsman (if relevant). 
30   Author’s interview with a Commission official, formerly DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004. 
31   Author’s interview with a Commission official, Horizontal Co-ordination Unit, DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004. EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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phrases, such as the references to international or European standards’.
32 The Commission officials 
involved in the actual drafting of the Reports generally emphasised that they did not feel bound or 
restricted by the previous reports or the Horizontal Unit’s guidance when producing their first draft. 
Nevertheless, some admitted that over time the submissions by the EU delegations became ‘relatively 
complete’ and ‘provided the jargon’.
33 The in-house drafting usually began around the end of June 
once all the different submissions had been received and the meetings with other international 
organisations had been held. Over the summer both the relevant line DGs and the Country Desks were 
involved in the revising of the drafts overseen by the Horizontal Unit. The texts were generally ready 
for consultation with the Legal Service in September. 
The Reports were treated as confidential documents until their official release in October or 
November. ‘The candidate countries were often trying to find the weakest link in the chain to obtain 
bits of the report in advance—and sometimes it worked.’
34 About six weeks before the publication of 
the Reports, high-level civil servants from the candidate countries (usually the chief negotiators) were 
briefed about the key findings by the Director General, the head of the Horizontal Co-ordination Unit 
and further Commission officials involved in the monitoring exercise. At this stage, the conclusions to 
the Reports had not been finalised yet, leaving the candidate countries a final chance to submit 
documentation regarding recent developments. In between the annual Reports—usually once per 
presidency—the Country Desks provided the Council with shorter updates along the lines of the 
Reports. The candidate countries and the EU delegations regularly provided follow-up information for 
these updates. For the first-wave accession countries, the Commission issued Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports in the autumn of 2003, which dropped the political section and focused solely on 
the acquis. Minority-related issues were mentioned in the context of non-discrimination under chapter 
13 (Social Policy), thereby reflecting a wider institutional development: over time the line DGs had 
started to build more direct contacts with the candidate countries, thereby gradually moving the 
emphasis away from DG Enlargement. DG Justice and Home Affairs, DG Employment and DG 
Regional Policy are now becoming the Commission’s focal point for minority-related issues. 
The Characteristics of the Reports 
A comparative study of the Regular Reports 1998-2002 reveals their three key characteristics with 
regard to the minority criterion: a hierarchy of minority issues, ad hocery and inconsistencies resulting 
from the lack of clear benchmarks and a dilemma of implementation. Although most of the ten CEE 
candidate countries have significant minority populations, only two minority groups are consistently 
stressed in the Regular Reports: the Russophone minority in Estonia and Latvia, and the Roma 
minorities of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. In the first Reports on 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, for example, the Roma are the only minority issue 
commented on at all, despite the fact that there are numerically greater minority groups in these 
countries. This ‘hierarchy’ of minority issues reflects the EU’s interest in good relations with its most 
powerful neighbour and energy supplier Russia and its own soft security concerns linked to migration. 
Furthermore, a non-territorialised, internally diverse and marginalised minority like the Roma, is a 
politically less sensitive group to focus on, compared with territorialised and politically mobilised 
minorities, such as the Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania or the Turks in Bulgaria. Undoubtedly, 
the Roma face severe problems of systematic discrimination, political and social exclusion, 
segregation, and poverty, but this is by no means a specific feature of the candidate countries.
35  
                                                      
32   Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG Enlargement, Brussels, 12 January 2004. 
33   Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG Enlargement, Brussels, 13 January 2004. 
34   Author’s interview with a Commission official, formerly Horizontal Co-Ordination Unit, DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004.  
35   See Rachel Guglielmo, 2004. ‘Minority Protection. Long-term Implications of the EU Accession Process’, Paper presented 
at the conference Minority Protection and the EU: The Way Forward, European Academy, Bolzano, 30-31 January. Gwendolyn Sasse 
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In essence, the Reports are a patchwork of formulaic codes encapsulating ‘progress’ on the road to 
membership. The general commitment of the candidate countries to improve minority protection is 
taken at face value and described positively as ‘continuing commitment to the protection of minority 
rights’, ‘a number of positive developments’, ‘significant progress’, ‘considerable efforts’, 
‘considerable progress’, ‘consolidating and deepening […] the respect for and protection of 
minorities’.
36 Some candidate countries earn generic praise, for example through the statement that 
minorities are ‘well integrated into Hungarian society’ or that Hungary has a ‘well-developed 
institutional framework protecting the interests of its minorities and promoting their cultural and 
educational autonomy’.
37 The Regular Reports are designed in a way that renders them a cumulative 
success story for each candidate country. Positive developments are recorded, even when the previous 
Reports had not specified any problems in these areas. 
The Regular Reports illustrate the EU’s difficulties in measuring progress in the absence of clear 
benchmarks in the field of minority rights. The Reports track the adoption and amendment of laws on 
citizenship, naturalisation, language and elections, the establishment of institutions that manage 
minority issues within the executive or legislative structures, and the launch of government 
programmes to address minority needs. Trends are evaluated by numerical benchmarks, such as the 
number of minority members obtaining citizenship, the number of requests for naturalisation, the pass 
rate for language or citizenship tests, the number of school or classes taught in the state or minority 
languages, the number of teachers trained to teach in the state or minority languages and the extent of 
media broadcasting in minority languages.  
The Reports make frequent general references to ‘international standards’ or ‘European standards’ 
and cross-reference the recommendations, activities and documents of the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE. This practice is most evident in the case of Latvia and Estonia, where the Europe Agreements 
included a reference to the need to comply ‘inter alia with the undertakings made within the context of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities’.
38 The 1998 Report on Latvia, for example, states that the Commission based 
its evaluations of Latvia’s citizenship and naturalisation policies on the extent to which they complied 
with OSCE recommendations.
39 The 1999 Report on Latvia asserts that: ‘Latvia now fulfils all 
recommendations expressed by the OSCE in the area of naturalisation and citizenship’.
40 Yet, fresh 
concerns over the linguistic rights of the Russophone minority are expressed in the 2001 Report on 
Latvia, which broadly refers to the ‘joint efforts’ of the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe to 
establish guidelines for the new language law.
41 The Reports indicate that the EU has also relied on the 
OSCE (and presumably also the Council of Europe) for some basic information and data gathering 
activities that are essential to professional monitoring. For example, the 1998 Report on Estonia quotes 
OSCE data on the number of minority members who gained citizenship. Alternatively, the 
unavailability of data is recorded, for example with regard to the implementation of language 
legislation in Slovakia in the 2000-2002 Reports.
42  
                                                      
36   Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession, 1998 (hereafter referred to as ‘Report on Romania, 1998 
etc.), p. 12; Report on Romania, 2001, p. 29; Report on Slovakia, 1999, p. 16; Report on Slovakia, 2002, p. 33; Report 
on Estonia, 2000, p. 20; Report on Estonia, 2001, p. 23. 
37    Report on Hungary, 2001, p. 22; Report on Hungary, 2002, p. 30. The Reports are available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_en.html.  
38   See OJ L68 of 9.3.98, pp. 3-4 and OJ L26 of 2.2.98, pp. 3-4. 
39   Report on Latvia, 1998, p. 11. 
40   Report on Latvia, 1999, p. 17. 
41   Report on Latvia, 2001, p. 26. 
42   Report on Estonia, 1999, p. 13; ibid, 2000, p. 18; Report on Slovakia, 2000, p. 20; ibid., 2001, p. 23; ibid., 2002, p. 32.  EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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Ad hocery and the borrowing of different external ‘standards’ have given rise to ambiguity and 
internal inconsistencies. The 2002 Reports on Estonia and Latvia, for example, report on the one hand 
that the OSCE mission in these states closed in late 2001, including the official OSCE reasons for this 
decision, whereas on the other hand, highlighting the EU’s continued concerns. The Report on Latvia, 
for example, ‘urged’ the country to ratify the FCNM and noted EU and OSCE concerns regarding the 
naturalisation and effective political participation of minorities in the context of restrictive language 
laws, including a reference to the 2002 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights against Latvia’s 
narrow application of the language proficiency criterion in the national parliament. Despite the inherent 
contradiction, the Report concluded that ‘the country has made considerable progress in further 
consolidating and deepening […] respect for and protection of minorities’.
43 As a Commission official 
put it: ‘Although the closure of the OSCE missions was not a formal condition, the Commission had a 
clear interest in it’.
44 The overall assessment of the Roma issue, in particular, hovers uncomfortably 
between the realisation that the socio-economic and political situation of the Roma has not improved 
and detailed lists of new activities and programmes targeting the needs of the Roma.
45 The fact that the 
Regular Reports harshly criticise the treatment of the Roma in the candidate countries, which are 
generally recognised as continuing ‘to fulfil the political Copenhagen criteria’, underlines that minority 
issues were not the EU’s priority during the accession process. As a Commission official in DG 
Enlargement put it: ‘There has been a constant inherent tension between the fulfilment of the political 
criteria and the criticism of the Roma treatment. We also lack benchmarks to determine when the issue 
would be considered sufficiently ‘resolved’. As long as the situation wasn’t getting any worse, we tried 
to be as consistent as possible by focusing on the direction of policy-making.’
46  
Throughout the accession process the Commission’s emphasis has shifted gradually from the 
adoption of the acquis towards issues of ‘capacity’ and implementation. However, the Regular Reports 
demonstrate that the Commission is less equipped to monitor and follow-up on problems of 
implementation. In the area of minority policies these problems are dealt with in general terms, listing 
the lack of funding, weak administrative capacity, understaffing and the low levels of public awareness 
in the candidate countries as the main shortcomings. On the one hand, the ‘gap between policy 
formulation and implementation’ is addressed most explicitly with reference to the Roma, for example 
in the Reports on Slovakia in 2000 and 2001.
47 Similarly, the potential implications of weak policy 
implementation are referred to most explicitly in the 2002 Report on Bulgaria, which obliquely notes 
that there are ‘signs of increased tension between the Roma and ethnic Bulgarians’.
48 On the other hand, 
the EU and the candidate countries at times appear to be acting out a charade on Roma policy. For 
example, the 1999 Report on Bulgaria states: ‘Significant progress was achieved concerning further 
integration of Roma through the adoption of a Framework Programme for ‘Full Integration of the Roma 
Population into the Bulgarian Society’ and establishment of relevant institutions at central and regional 
level’.
49 By what measure this formal adoption of a programme marks ‘significant progress’ is not clear, 
and two years later, little of this programme had been implemented.
50  
                                                      
43   Report on Latvia, 2002, pp. 30-35. 
44   Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG Enlargement, Brussels, 12 January 2004. 
45   This inherent tension is particularly striking in the Reports on the Czech Republic, which refer to the construction of a 
wall in Ušti nad Lábem that physically separates Roma and non-Roma residents. See the Report on the Czech Republic, 
1999, pp. 16-17; ibid, 2000, pp. 25-27. 
46   Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004. 
47   Report on Slovakia, 2000, p. 22; ibid, 2000, p. 31. 
48   Report on Bulgaria, 2002, p. 33. Without referring back to this alarmist scenario, the 2003 Report offers a much more 
optimistic assessment based on more realistic budgetary provisions for a government programme: ‘On the whole, 
initiatives have started to address the situation of the Roma minority’, see Report on Bulgaria, 2003, p. 26. 
49   Report on Bulgaria, 1999, p. 75. 
50   See Iavor Rangelov, 2001. ‘Bulgaria’s Struggle to Make Sense of EU Human Rights Criteria’, EUMAP, 1 October, 
available at: http://www.eumap.org/articles/content/10 Gwendolyn Sasse 
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It seems as if more lip service can be paid to the Roma issue by the candidate countries’ 
governments without risking domestic political tensions or seriously straining the relations with the 
EU. Last but not least, EU-inspired policies can also have some counterproductive effects. In 2001 
Romania adopted a package of policies targeting the Roma for which it gained praise in the Regular 
Report 2002. In Romania’s 2003 Report the Commission notes progress, but also an overall ‘uneven’ 
implementation of the Roma Strategy of 2001.
51 The package included the appointment of advisors 
who would advise the regional prefects on Roma-related issues. Though formally implemented, this 
measure has done little to change perceptions or policy outcomes.
52 It has, however, separated ‘Roma 
issues’ from mainstream policy-making reinforces marginalisation and contributes to a growing 
frustration among the office holders, Roma activists and the wider Roma community. Moreover, there 
is a misfit between the political and civil rights promoted by the EU and other international 
organisations, which the Roma at large have not benefited from, and the need for tangible social and 
economic rights in a post-communist context of high Roma unemployment. 
Views from ‘Inside’: The Perceptions of Policy-Makers 
Judging by the author’s interviews in the Commission,
53 the notion of a double standard now occupies 
a prominent position in the perceptions of policy-makers currently or previously involved in the EU’s 
monitoring of minority rights in the accession countries. Not all of them accepted that such a double 
standard exists, but even those who argued against its existence or relevance brought up the issue 
without being prompted to do so, thereby illustrating an acute awareness of the grey zone in which the 
Commission has had to define the parameters of its monitoring exercise. There is widespread 
normative agreement that a double standard should not guide EU policy: ‘there shouldn’t be any 
double standards, in particular as the Commission doesn’t have any competence in the area of minority 
rights’. In addition to references to the EU’s lack of legal competence, Commission officials also 
compared the situation in the old and new Member States: ‘one has to keep in mind the whole time 
that the situation isn’t perfect inside the EU either, and we certainly can’t expect more than in the 
current Member States, in particular given the new members’ weak financial resources.’ The reference 
to a ‘virtual report’ has become a standard phrase inside the Commission: ‘if you took the worst case 
from the current Member States on every issue, this virtual candidate would not qualify for EU entry’. 
Put differently, a certain drive to ‘create the perfect Member State’ has inspired the EU’s monitoring 
exercise. Commission officials involved in the drafting of the Reports have been aware of an inherent 
‘consistency problem’, in particular in the sections which were not explicitly based on the acquis, 
most notably the political criteria. Moreover, some of them pointed out that ‘the links as well as the 
distinctions between the political criteria and the other criteria were not always clear’. An awareness 
of the notion of a double standard is also reflected in ‘the political decision not to comment on the 
political criteria any more in the 2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report’. The Commission decided 
that it was against the logic of the accession process to monitor the political criteria again at the very 
end of the process, although some officials inside DG Enlargement had argued in favour of the 
inclusion of a political assessment in the final round of monitoring. 
In the words of one Commission official, ‘the Regular Reports marked the key moment in the 
accession process each year. They were carefully worded, and they were carefully studied.’ At times 
there were ‘long discussions about the wording’ in specific sections of the Reports. In this context a 
                                                      
51   Report on Romania, 2003, p. 30. 
52   István Pogány, 2003. ‘The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Treatment of National and Ethnic Minorities in CEE’, 
Paper given at the Workshop Implications of Enlargement for the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in 
Post-Communist Legal Orders, European University Institute, Florence, 28-29 November. 
53   The following quotes, unless specifically footnoted, are taken from the author’s interviews with 7 Commission officials 
from DG Enlargement (Country Desks and Horizontal Co-ordination Unit) which were conducted in Brussels on 12 
and 13 January 2004. EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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Commission official admitted that ‘there is a lot of hidden meaning to the text’ of the Reports and that 
‘the strange wording tends to reflect political compromises’. From the Commissions’ perspective the 
Reports are generally portrayed as being ‘pretty objective’. Behind this general consensus, however, 
there is some notable divergence in views: while one official from the Horizontal Co-ordination Unit 
described the result of the annual monitoring exercise simply as ‘a neutral report by a neutral body’, an 
official from the Legal Service was more critical: ‘the Reports are a far cry from an objective picture. 
They are too optimistic and lack in bite.’
54 In contrast to other Commission documents, DG 
Enlargement had a monopoly over the drafting process, thereby turning the Reports into ‘political 
documents of the Commissioner for Enlargement’. The Reports reflect the fact that ultimately the 
Commissioner had no interest in creating new obstacles, given that his main goal was to see the 
negotiations through to the end.’
55 Despite this criticism, the official conceded that the 2003 Reports 
for Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey as well as the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports signalled an 
improvement in the structure, content and use of the monitoring exercise. Indeed, there was 
widespread agreement among Commission officials involved in the monitoring at different levels and 
stages of the process that the quality of the Reports had improved over time. The Comprehensive 
Monitoring Reports were strictly focused on the acquis, thereby allowing for an ‘all in all more 
pragmatic approach’ and making them ‘more objective’ than their predecessors. 
In the view of some Commission officials involved in the monitoring, ‘the Regular Reports have 
increased the political relevance of the political criteria for the EU itself.’ As one Commission official 
from DG Justice and Home Affairs put it: ‘In many old Member States minorities have been a taboo. 
Now the Commission has given the issue a new emphasis, and at least we now recognise the need to 
address these issues.’ From here the official jumped to a very optimistic conclusion: ‘The new Member 
States will maintain this emphasis and help to overcome the fears of some old Member States. Their 
fears to open up a Pandora’s box of territorial and economic demands, for example by ratifying the 
FCNM, are bound to fade with the progress of European integration. France’s position will not be 
tenable for much longer, and Greece will follow.’
56 This rosy post-enlargement scenario did not resonate 
with the majority of the Commission officials interviewed by the author. Most of them simply referred to 
the fact that the process of European integration would have to take over from where the EU’s 
monitoring had left off. The view prevailed that the enlargement process had not had a ‘spill-over effect’ 
on the discussion about minority issues inside the Union, not even with regard to the Roma issue. The 
Commission officials spoke of a temporal coincidence between the enlargement process, the EU’s push 
for more comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and the establishment of the Network of 
Independent Experts, which is funded by the Commission and began monitoring fundamental rights in 
the Member States in 2002. However, they did not identify a direct link between these developments. 
Beyond some defensive and vociferous statements about the ‘success’ of the EU’s monitoring 
exercise, its actual impact has been described rather realistically in Commission circles. ‘In general’, 
one official said, ‘the Regular Reports were good for the EU to establish the candidates’ strengths and 
weaknesses, and they were good for the candidate countries because governments and civil society 
could refer to them to facilitate domestic policy changes.’
57 Another official described the impact of 
the Regular Reports as twofold: ‘their most immediate impact has been on legislation, but they have 
also influenced the mentality and public debate in each country. They have helped to redraw the line 
of political correctness, for example with regard to statements about the Roma. Implementation, 
                                                      
54   Author’s interview with an official from the Legal Service, Brussels, 13 January 2004. 
55   Ibid. According to this official, the Hungarian Status Law (behind the scenes the Commission and the Legal Service 
were much more involved than the Reports suggest), the Sudeten Germans and the issue of German names in Poland 
were among the issues sidestepped by the Reports, while Russia’s concerns tended to be treated overly cautiously. The 
official also noted the overall absence of a critical engagement with the Reports in the European Parliament. 
56   Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG Justice and Home Affairs, 12 January 2004. 
57   Author’s interview with a Commission official, Horizontal Co-ordination Unit, DG Enlargement, 13 January 2004.  Gwendolyn Sasse 
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however, has only begun, and the momentum has to be kept alive.’ Last but not least, the impact of the 
EU’s monitoring exercise might be best understood as having a ‘lock-in effect’ and reinforcing 
existing trends. In the words of one Commission official, ‘we help them do what they are already 
doing anyway’. This balance and interaction between domestic and external incentives for policy 
change requires closer attention. 
Domestic vs. External Incentives for Minority Rights 
It is self-evident that domestic political will is required to generate sustainable policy outcomes 
inspired by external conditionality. The exact relationship between domestic political incentives and 
EU conditionality in the area of minority protection is difficult to pin down, and the interlocking 
conditions and recommendations of institutions like the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
make it impossible to disentangle their respective effects. Nevertheless, the timing of certain decisions, 
for example the adoption of international instruments or anti-discrimination legislation,
58  and the 
domestic political context of individual candidate countries provide insights into the effectiveness of 
EU conditionality and, more specifically, the conditions facilitating or limiting the EU’s impact.  
Given the EU’s frequent references to external ‘standards’ of minority protection, in particular the 
FCNM, the ratification of this document by the candidate countries provides for a rough correlation 
between enlargement conditionality and a degree of commitment to minority policy in CEE. All ten 
CEE candidate countries signed the FCNM. Almost all of them signed up shortly after the document 
was opened for signature on 1 February 1995, though the process of ratification and implementation 
took longer. Only Latvia had still not ratified the document when joining the EU. The early 
commitment of the candidate countries to the FCNM contrasts with some of the old EU Member 
States that have still not ratified it.
59 Among the CEE countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and 
Slovenia added special declarations to the FCNM, a practice fairly evenly spread among EU Member 
States and candidate countries. The Bulgarian declaration, for example, cautiously refers to ‘the policy 
of protection of human rights and tolerance to persons belonging to minorities’ and stipulates that the 
ratification and implementation of the Framework Convention do not imply ‘any right to engage in 
any activity violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the unitary Bulgarian state, its internal 
and international security’.
60 Estonia’s declaration is concerned with specifying its own legal 
definition of ‘national minorities’, who are stated to be ‘citizens of Estonia who reside on the territory 
of Estonia; maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with Estonia; are distinct from Estonians on 
the basis of their ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; and are motivated by a concern 
to preserve together their cultural traditions, their religion or their language which constitute the basis 
of their common identity’.
61 Similarly, Poland’s declaration affirms that it recognises as national 
minorities only those residing in the Republic of Poland who are Polish citizens. It also includes a 
reference to international agreements protecting ‘national minorities in Poland and minorities or 
groups of Poles in other States’.
62 Slovenia’s declaration limits its definition of national minorities to 
‘the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national minorities’, but also states that the provisions also 
                                                      
58   Non-discrimination as an EU norm is rooted in the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, the Directives 2000/78/EC 
and 2000/43/EC and ECJ rulings. The adoption of the acquis involves anti-discrimination legislation and the 
implementation of the Race Equality Directive. 
59   France has not even signed it; see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm  
60   Bulgaria, Declaration of 7 May 1999. 
61   Estonia, Declaration of 6 January 1997. 
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apply to ‘the members of the Roma community, who live in the Republic of Slovenia’, while 
excluding its numerically largest minority group, the Croatians.
63 
The Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was 
opened for signature as early as November 1992. It proved more controversial among candidate 
countries (and Member States), not least because of the specific obligations it imposes on the 
signatories, such as the establishment of a committee monitoring compliance. The Regular Reports 
record the ratification of the Charter by individual countries, but they do not use it as a standard point of 
reference comparable to the FCNM. By the end of March 2004 only three of the ten CEE candidates 
(Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) had ratified it.
64 All three countries ratified in the latter stages of the 
enlargement process, between 1998 and 2002, but they added specific, and rather complex declarations 
to it which tend to add to the ambiguity in defining the differences between a regional and a national 
language. Slovenia’s Declaration states that only the Hungarian and Italian languages ‘are considered as 
regional or minority languages’.
65 It also limits the number of provisions applied to the above-
mentioned languages. Slovakia’s Declaration confers the status of regional or minority language to 
Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Roma, Ruthenian and Ukrainian. However, it 
also establishes a hierarchy of languages according to which Hungarian, followed by Ukrainian and 
Ruthenian, enjoy more far-reaching rights, for example the availability of pre-school education in a 
particular language as opposed to the right to apply for this type of education. The Slovakian 
Declaration also stipulates that it defines the ECRML’s term ‘territory in which the regional or minority 
language is used’ as that provided for by Slovak law as those ‘municipalities in which the citizens of 
the Slovak Republic belonging to national minorities form at least 20% of the population’.
66  
In conjunction with the ratification of international instruments of minority protection, EU 
conditionality has also contributed to the salience of minority rights on the domestic political agendas 
in CEE
67 but a range of factors, such as the size of the minority, its location, resources and degree of 
political mobilisation, the relations between majority and minority groups, the involvement of kin 
states, the constitutional design of the new regime and its transition path, has interacted with external 
conditionality and produced varied policy outcomes. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania are instructive 
cases to demonstrate some of these similarities and differences. 
Hungary: Minority Protection as a National Interest 
Several countries legislated for minority protection, or were in the final stages of doing so, prior to the 
Copenhagen criteria. Some of these were inclusive measures, providing for autonomy arrangements 
and privileged quotas of representation in national parliaments. Hungary passed a law ‘On The Rights 
of National and Ethnic Minorities’ in 1993 that granted collective rights and cultural autonomy to 13 
recognised minorities.
68 This law built on Article 68 in the amended Hungarian constitution of 1990, 
which had anchored the protection of ‘national and ethnic minorities’ as well as their collective 
participation in public life and representation through local and national government organisations. 
                                                      
63   Slovenia, Declaration of 25 March 1998. According to the 1991 census, there were 81,220 Serbo-Croat speakers, and 
52,110 Croat speakers, but only 9,240 Hungarian speakers, 4,009 Italian speakers, and 2,847 Romani speakers. See 
http://www.ecmi.de/emap/slo_stat.html  
64   Romania, the Czech Republic and Poland have signed, though not yet ratified the ECRML. 
65   Slovenia, Declaration of 4 October 2000. 
66   Slovakia, Declaration of 5 September 2001. 
67   After the introduction of the Regular Reports all of the CEE candidates formally adopted government programmes to 
protect or integrate minority groups. According to EUMAP’s 2002 monitoring reports, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania are committed to a comprehensive approach to minority protection, by policies to eliminate 
discrimination and actively promote minority identities. See EUMAP, 2002, p. 25. 
68   http://www.riga.lv/minelres/NationalLegislation/Hungary/Hungary_Minorities_English.htm Gwendolyn Sasse 
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Most of Hungary’s minorities are quite small and not politically mobilised. On the whole, they had 
little impact on the 1993 Act. Instead, the historical resonance of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which 
left large Hungarian territorialised minorities in neighbouring states (Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, 
Ukraine), has underpinned the political will in favour of minority protection both at home and abroad.  
While the endogenous incentives for a far-reaching minority rights regime are easy to trace in the 
case of Hungary, the effects are more difficult to assess. In terms of intra-state relations, Hungary’s 
policies have both encouraged bilateral agreements and provoked concern and angry responses from 
political groups in neighbouring countries. Even the 1993 law itself contained a dual agenda: the 
active strengthening of the cultural and linguistic identity of Hungary’s minorities was bound to exert 
explicit and implicit pressure on the governments and minorities in neighbouring states. The 
implementation of the 1993 Act indicates further peculiarities: local governments receive payments to 
offset the costs of minority education, thereby creating an incentive to inflate the number of children 
requiring education in their own language. According to Hungarian government statistics of 1998, 
almost 45,000 primary-school children were enrolled in German-minority programmes, although the 
last census recorded only about 8,000 Germans living in Hungary.
69 
Local minority self-governments (or councils) have mushroomed as a result of the simple 
procedure by which they are set up.
70 By 1999 there were already more than 1,400 registered across 
the country, half of which are Roma councils, followed by German councils as the second most 
represented group.
71 These local councils, in turn, elect a council at the national level. In theory, the 
councils are supposed to have extensive consent and consultation rights with regard to laws impacting 
on minority issues, such as culture, education and the media. While there is evidence of such 
consultation between the national-level councils and the Hungarian parliament, the involvement of the 
local councils seems to be minimal. The main function of the councils, therefore, is to promote 
minority culture, but the limited funding at the local level has curbed their potential. While the 
national minority governments receive state funding according to the size of the minority, the local 
governments all receive a small flat sum. There is also evidence of local governments trying to shift 
responsibility for minority issues to the minority councils, especially in the case of the Roma. The 
election of the minority self-government councils takes place alongside the national elections in a two-
ballot system. Anybody can vote for the members of self-governments irrespective of his/her 
nationality, which is not registered. The only restriction is that a vote can only be cast for one of the 
self-governments. It is hard to track voting patterns in these elections, but the emergence of a Serbian 
nationalist on a Croatian council or the popularity of German councils, which are associated with 
external funding and travel opportunities, suggest a range of voting motivations.
72 The minority 
groups, in turn, are interested in high voter turnout to boost their national-level funding.  
Most importantly, the progressive 1993 law represents only one of several elements of Hungary’s 
minority policy. The highly controversial Hungarian ‘Status Law’ of 2001, giving rights and 
entitlements to Hungarians living in other countries, brings the primary rationale behind the 1993 Act 
to a logical conclusion but can hardly be seen to contribute to the consolidation of good-neighbourly 
relations and stability within neighbouring states.
73 Moreover, Hungary produced a draft anti-
discrimination law in the second half of 2003, suggesting a slow uptake of minority-related issues 
                                                      
69   See Deets, p. 39. 
70   Local self-governments are either set up by the local government or by the initiative of five minority members who 
gain the support of 100 people in the elections. 
71   Deets., p. 49. 
72   Ibid., p. 50. 
73   For a detailed discussion of the ‘Status Law’ and its challenge to modern notions of territoriality and citizenship, see 
Brigid Fowler, 2002. Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: A Framework for Interpreting the Hungarian 
‘Status Law’ as a New Form of Kin-State Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ 
Programme, Working Paper, 40/02. EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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inside the country.
74 Commission officials from DG Employment and DG Enlargement, however, 
emphasise that the anti-discrimination legislation represents a more comprehensive package than in 
some other candidate countries and is based on a wider process of consultation.
75  
The case of Hungary demonstrates the overarching significance of domestic incentives for minority 
protection, the ambiguity and practical difficulties attached to the implementation of collective rights 
and a certain corrective effect of EU conditionality (underpinned by the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities) on potentially destabilising policies like the 
‘Status Law’. In the context of the discussions about the Status Law the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission did not per se rule out co-ethnic socio-economic entitlements, provided they are available 
to other foreign citizens. The European Commission’s emphasis on the Schengen agreement, the 
exclusion of Austria from Hungary’s law and the repeated references to the need to amend the law to 
comply with EC law signalled the limited scope of the law after Hungary’s accession to the EU.
76 The 
Commission reproduced the wording of the recommendations of the Venice Commission in its 
Reports, but restricted itself to urging Hungary to complete agreements with Romania and Slovakia on 
the implementation of the law. Behind the scenes the Commission, including the Legal Service, 
commented in detail on the Law and recommended changes which were not taken up by the Fidesz 
government, illustrating once again the lack of EU competence in this area and the importance of 
domestic political constellations. The EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe paved the way for a 
new round of bilateral treaties under a new Hungarian government.
77 The Romanian-Hungarian 
Agreement of September 2003 and the Slovak-Hungarian Agreement of December 2003 effectively 
reduce the original law to a mutual declaration of support for cultural and linguistic activities for the 
Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia and the Romanians and Slovaks in Hungary.  
Slovakia and Romania: Regime Change through Minority Participation 
The presence of sizeable, politically mobilised Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania allows 
for a comparison of their interaction with the respective majorities and sheds light on the dynamics 
between endogenous political developments and external interests and incentives—here represented 
by the Hungarian government and various European organisations. Romania adopted provisions for 
minority representation in parliament before the process of EU accession got under way.
78 Its 
progressive 1992 election law was not the result of active minority campaigning, but an early signal to 
the West and the EU—preceding the Copenhagen criteria—that the Romanian government protects its 
minorities. The law was also a good-will gesture to smaller minorities, but it failed to address the most 
pressing issues concerning the Hungarians and the Roma.
79  
                                                      
74   See Guido Schwellnus, 2003. ‘Conditionality and its Misfits: Non-Discrimination and Minority Protection in the EU 
Enlargement Process’, Paper given at the Workshop The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: Evaluating the 
Conditionality Model, European University Institute, Florence, 4-5 July. 
75   Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG Enlargement, 20 February 2004 and with a Commission official 
from the Unit Anti-Discrimination, Fundamental Social Rights and Civil Society, DG Employment and Social Affairs, 
20 February 2004. 
76   Report on Hungary, 2001, p. 91, and ibid., 2002, p. 122. 
77   According to a Commission official, then DG Enlargement, the EU and the OSCE were more important than the 
Council of Europe in this context due to their detailed legal recommendations and their contacts to the incoming 
socialist government; author’s interview, Brussels, 20 February 2004. 
78   Romania’s 1992 election law enables minority organisations to field candidates and guarantees a seat in parliament for a 
minority failing to cross the three per cent threshold on the condition that they receive more than five per cent of the average 
vote needed to elect one representative. In the 1996 election this number was as low as 1,800 votes. See Deets, p. 46. 
79    The fact that representatives of the state-funded minority organisations—the state funds one organisation per 
minority—dominate among the minority deputies in parliament and the low rates of ethnic voting of medium-sized 
minorities compared with a proliferation of very small minorities demonstrate the pitfalls of a policy which looks 
progressive at first glance. See ibid., p. 48. Gwendolyn Sasse 
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In Slovakia, four Hungarian parties emerged in the early transition phase, illustrating that the 
Hungarian minority did not represent a unified political force. A first ethnically inclusive government, 
involving a Hungarian party, collapsed quickly. The emergence of the sovereignty issue on the 
Czechoslovak political agenda ‘ethnicised’ statehood and the political process as a whole. The Slovak 
majority and the Hungarian minority favoured a common state with the Czechs, but the distance between 
the Slovak political elite and the Hungarian minority grew, especially when the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) formed a coalition with the Slovak National Party in 1992.
80 In Romania a 
single Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, emerged as early as 1989, 
but it combined within its own ranks a range of different viewpoints. Iliescu’s National Front initially 
proclaimed a commitment to collective minority rights in return for the Hungarian party’s support, but 
Iliescu—like Meciar—polarized ethnopolitical differences in their attempt to build nation-states. Iliescu’s 
regime lasted from 1990-1996, while Meciar stayed in power 1992-1998. In both cases Hungarian 
minority parties were represented in parliament, questioning their respective governments’ policies, 
especially institutional safeguards for minority representation, language and regional administration. In 
Romania, the Hungarian party countered the increasing centralisation and restrictive language legislation 
with calls for territorial autonomy. While national territorial autonomy did not emerge as the Hungarian 
parties’ priority in Slovakia, they went on collision course with Meciar’s plan to redraw regional 
administrative boundaries so as to break up the relatively compact Hungarian settlements.  
The Hungarian minority elites formed part of the political opposition in both countries, but the 
majority-minority ethnic division did not become the only or predominant cleavage structure. Instead, 
three clusters of parties representing ‘majority nationalist, majority moderate and minority pluralist 
perspectives’ on state-building crystallised.
81 Gradually, the Hungarian parties increased their 
cooperation with the Slovak and Romanian opposition parties, although these attempts were initially 
overshadowed by frictions. In 1994 the Slovak-Hungarian opposition managed to topple the Meciar 
government in a vote of no-confidence, but already six months later the HZDS was re-elected and, under 
Meciar’s leadership, managed to divide and suppress the opposition forces. Thus, the friendship treaty 
with Hungary, which clearly ruled out autonomy rights for minorities, was signed in 1995 and a number 
of laws was passed with the full or at least partial support of the Slovak opposition: the State Language 
Act of 1995, making Slovak the only official language, the act on the redrawing of the territorial 
administrative boundaries in 1996, trying to minimise the political strength of the Hungarian minority in 
areas where it constituted a numerical majority, amendments to the act on school administration, limiting 
the authority of local communities over schools, and a law on the elevation of a national Slovak 
organisation (Matica slovenská) to the highest national cultural, social and scientific organisation.
82 On 
the basis of the political Copenhagen criterion, Slovakia was excluded from the first wave of candidates 
at the Luxembourg Council in 1997 and was sharply criticised in the Report of 1998.
83 
The Hungarian parties’ demands for regional self-government proved the biggest stumbling bloc 
for the cooperation between Hungarian and Slovak opposition parties. Over time the Hungarian parties 
switched to an emphasis on decentralization and local government, thus allowing for a narrowing of 
the political divide within the opposition. The electoral law of 1998 led to the consolidation of one 
moderate Slovak opposition party (Slovak Democratic Coalition) and the Hungarian Coalition, made 
up of three Hungarian parties. In Romania, the Hungarian party and the Romanian political opposition 
encountered similar differences in defining more coherent positions and reaching a compromise. 
Shared conceptions regarding the nature of the postcommunist state and its relationship with other 
European democracies were at the heart of the political coalitions toppling Iliescu in 1996 and Meciar 
                                                      
80   Zsuzsa Csergö, 2002. ‘Beyond Ethnic Division: Majority-Minority Debate About the Postcommunist State in Romania 
and Slovakia’, East European Politics and Societies, 16 (1), pp. 4-5. 
81   Csergö, p. 13. 
82   Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
83   By 1998 Romania was already seen to fulfil the political Copenhagen criteria; see Report on Romania, 1998, p. 12. EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy 
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in 1998. In Romania the resulting coalition governments struggled for a political compromise on 
amending restrictive laws on language use, education and administration and managed to forge a 
consensus in the end.
84 The regime change in Slovakia marked the beginning of new state policy on 
minorities, which quickly became an integral part of the attempt of Dzurinda’s government to speed 
up economic reforms and integrate into Western security and political and economic structures. In a 
direct response to the earlier criticisms of the EU and the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities it prioritised the adoption of a new language law in advance of the Commission meeting of 
July 1999, which was scheduled to review Slovakia’s accession prospects.
85 The new language law 
came to symbolize the regime change and placed Slovakia into the first wave of the candidate 
countries. The language law allows the use of minority languages in local public administration 
subject to a minority population threshold of 20 per cent in a given area.
86 The Commission’s 1999 
Report declared that the requisite ‘significant progress’ in this policy area had been delivered, despite 
the fact that the final text of the law was adopted without the support of the governing Hungarian 
parties. Definitional ambiguities in the text and a problem of legal precedence with regard to the more 
restrictive provisions of the constitution of 1992 further overshadowed the implementation of the 
law.
87 In its Opinion on Slovakia, adopted on 22 September 2000, the Advisory Committee on the 
FCNM noted on the one hand that the implementation of the 1995 State Language Law ‘has not, to 
date, had a widespread negative impact on minority languages’, while stressing on the other hand ‘that 
the State Language Law is lacking in clarity’ and could at the very least ‘produce a ‘chilling effect’ 
extending to legitimate activities of minorities’. Moreover, it asked for the relationship between the 
Law on the Use of National Minority Languages of 1999 and the State Language Law to be clarified.
88 
Slovakia and Romania are instructive cases in several respects: firstly, they demonstrate how the 
incentive of EU membership, tied to a bundle of political criteria, can help to galvanise domestic 
political forces in favour of a democratic regime change. In both cases minority parties, which already 
existed as organised opposition forces, played a crucial and active role in this process. Furthermore, 
the EU’s critique of the 1995 Slovak language law is a rare example of an explicit EU stance on a 
specific piece of minority-sensitive legislation. Secondly, the predominant political conflicts in 
Romania and Slovakia did not hinge on ethnic divisions. In the early transition period the main 
political majority embarked on centralised nation-state building. The Hungarian parties fairly 
consistently represented the ethnic and political minority in opposition to the ruling party. Over time 
they built a joint electoral platform with the moderate Slovak and Romanian forces, thereby cutting 
across ethnic divisions and forging a new political majority. These coalitions proved essential for state 
consolidation and democratisation. Thirdly, the EU contributed to the creation of the domestic 
political space for minority participation, but it did not intervene in the internal disputes over the 
appropriate institutional responses to minority demands, as seen in the case of the new Slovak 
language law of 1999. Moreover, the democratisation and Europeanisation processes neither put an 
end to the domestic disputes over minority issues, nor did they guarantee a smooth political and 
economic reform process, as the case of Romania demonstrates. 
                                                      
84   Ibid., p. 23. 
85   The coalition also agreed to sign the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages and the FCNM. 
86   See Slovakia’s Law on the Use of Minority Languages (11 July 1999), Art. 2(1), 51; 
http://www.riga.lv/minelres/NationalLegislation/Slovakia/Slovakia_MinorLang_English.htm 
The Romanian Law on Local Public Administration (23 April 2001) envisages the same threshold; see: 
http://www.riga.lv/minelres/NationalLegislation/Romania/Romania_LocAdm2001_excerpts_English.htm 
87   For a discussion of the interaction of Slovakia’s laws and EU pressures, see Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gál, 2000. The 
New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics. ECMI Working Paper No. 8, September: 1-71, available at: 
http://www.ecmi.de/doc/download/working_paper_8.pdf  
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Conclusion: Evaluating the ‘Minority Momentum’ of EU Enlargement 
The empirical evidence suggests that, on balance, international actors and a vaguely defined 
European norm framed the debates and perceptions and affected the timing and nature of specific 
pieces of legislation, while the domestic political constellations and pressures ultimately had a more 
significant effect on the institutional and policy outcomes. The EU has had an impact if its vague 
conditions in the field of minority protection fit the domestic political agenda and could be 
empowered by it, in particular during the early stages of the accession process. EU conditionality in 
the area of minority protection is, thus, best understood as the cumulative effect of different 
international institutions. The actual policy leverage of the EU in minority protection has been 
anchored in the instruments and recommendations of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and a 
range of other actors, including NGOs, have translated them into the domestic political context. The 
changes to the citizenship and naturalisation provisions in Estonia and Latvia, in particular, 
demonstrate to what extent the EU has drawn on the recommendations of the OSCE, especially the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Council of Europe. The policy domain of 
minority protection not only questions the notion of EU conditionality per se and widens the notion 
of ‘Europeanisation’ by highlighting the need to investigate the links (and gaps) between different 
international institutions and tools, it also decouples ethnic minorities and majorities from political 
minorities and majorities in the study of transition politics. The states and societies in CEE are 
‘divided’ in different and cross-cutting ways. Minority rights form an integral part of the political 
process and, consequently, need to be continuously monitored and adjusted, preferably through a 
combination of domestic and external mechanisms.  
The decision calculus of the ruling elites in the candidate countries over whether to comply with 
EU conditionality has been shaped not only by their perceptions of how a particular decision may 
affect the accession process of their country, but also by the degree of domestic mobilisation among 
majority or minority groups, the elites’ definition of ‘national interests’
89 and personal concerns about 
power and political risks. EU conditionality has anchored minority protection in the political agenda of 
the candidate states, but the EU had little to offer in terms of substantive guidance, as the lack of 
benchmarks, inconsistencies and the limited scope for follow-up on implementation in the Regular 
Reports demonstrate. The Hungarian case illustrates best how the domestic political will in favour of 
minority protection is critically shaped by national interests, namely the concern for the sizeable 
Hungarian minorities located in neighbouring countries. Here the EU has acted as one of the brakes on 
the controversial Hungarian Status Law. In general, it is easier to trace the EU’s impact on specific 
laws or regulations. The adoption of Slovakia’s language law of July 1999 is one of the best examples 
of a close link to the EU accession process, as reflected in the Regular Reports. The cases of Slovakia 
and Romania confirm that the EU’s political leverage is greatest in the early phase of the accession 
process and, in the presence of organised minority interests, helps to legitimise and anchor these actors 
in the domestic political scene.  
One of the main achievements of the EU’s normative overstretch has been to implant the value and 
objective of minority protection in ‘EU speak’, which could be a first step towards internalisation, 
institutional change and modified political behaviour. It is too early to tell what the outcome of the 
interaction between West and East European models of minority protection will be in the post-
enlargement period. Rather than reinforcing the distinction between new and old Member States, the 
issue of minority rights cuts across geographical and historical boundaries. Two major scenarios are 
feasible: on the one hand a form of ‘reverse conditionality’, emanating from the new Member States, 
could infuse the EU with a new commitment to minority rights; on the other hand, a new tacit policy 
consensus on inaction may emerge within an enlarged EU. In the new Member States, a contraction in 
this domain could have a more immediate destabilizing effect. The potential for conflict involving the 
Roma has already been identified by the EU itself. For the time being, a combination of both scenarios 
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appears to be the most likely outcome: minority rights will make for one of several issue dimensions 
for coalition-building across old and new Member States. As long as the EU remains committed to 
further enlargement—to include Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia and other South-East European 
states—the ‘respect for and protection of national minorities’ will remain an integral part of the 
rhetoric of accession. In the case of Croatia, which gained candidate status in June 2004, the 
Copenhagen criteria were supplemented by the Stabilisation and Association Process of 1997 to 
include, inter alia, full cooperation with the ICTY, ‘real opportunities for displaced persons’, the 
return of refugees to their places of origin, non-discrimination and good-neighbourly relations.
90 
Though unlikely to become an internal EU policy priority, this momentum tied to future enlargement 
may promote awareness inside the EU and bolster the profile of related instruments, most importantly 
the FCNM and its complex and dynamic monitoring mechanism.  
A couple of initiatives point to the continued relevance of the monitoring of rights inside the EU. 
The Network of Independent Experts, which was set up upon a request by the European Parliament in 
connection with Art. 7 TEU and is funded by the Commission, marks a step in this direction. Its task is 
to monitor fundamental rights in the Member States, and its first two reports adopt a wide definition of 
fundamental rights, explicitly including minority issues.
91 However, these annual reports of 
independent experts will only have political clout if they become mandatory items on the agenda of all 
the main EU institutions.
92 Moreover, the re-design of the remit of the European Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia is currently under discussion.
93 The widening of the remit to include a human rights 
dimension could allow for more systematic minority-relevant research. 
Despite the link between the EU’s eastward enlargement and the ongoing constitution-making 
process at the European level, minority rights did not emerge as a prominent issue during the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. The resulting Draft Constitutional Treaty was void of any 
mention of minorities. The values and principles stipulated in the preamble, Part I and the preamble 
and the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provide indirect avenues for minority rights 
protection.
94 The wording of Article 2 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, stipulating the Union’s 
values, avoided the ambiguity of its predecessor (Article 6 TEU), which had copied the language of 
                                                      
90   See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/conditionality_29_april_97.htm  
91   The Network presents its annual reports as a follow-up to the EU’s Regular Reports, in particular in the area of 
minority rights and non-discrimination; see EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, 2003. Report 
on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2002. Luxembourg: European 
Communities, p. 21. Moreover, the experts advance the problematic claim that a general lack of EU competence in the 
area does ‘not in any way call into question the legitimacy of monitoring the policy followed by Member States in the 
field of human rights’; see ibid., p. 19. Despite the wide parameters within which the Network places its mandate, a 
Commission official from the Fundamental Rights Unit in DG Justice and Home Affairs, which prepared the ground 
for the Network to be established in response to a request from the European Parliament, described the 2002 report as 
‘too mild’ in an interview with the author, Brussels, 12 January 2004.  
92   As an official from DG External Relations phrased it: ‘At the moment the whole exercise is just Mr X’s Report, that’s 
all’; author’s interview with a Commission official, Unit Human Rights and Democratization, DG External Relations, 
20 February 2004. 
93   The Representatives of the Member States, meeting at Head of State or Government level in Brussels on 13 December 
2002, agreed to extend its mandate to become a Human Rights Agency; see 
http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/7FAB788D-1686-4A44-B977-974CCB70F69B/0/1205_location_EN.pdf 
According to a Commission official, this Council decision ‘came as a complete surprise to the Commission’ and forms part 
of a ‘late-night political deal’; author’s interview with a Commission official, DG External Relations, 20 February 2004. 
94   The preamble is potentially contradictory in its claim that the Union respects the ‘diversity of the cultures and traditions 
of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States […]’; see 
http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en. For a discussion of the legal and political norms that inform the Charter see 
Guido Schwellnus, 2001. ‘Much Ado About Nothing’: Minority Protection and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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the first Copenhagen criterion but left out the minority criterion.
95 During the IGC, which initially 
failed to generate an agreement, Hungary took a lead in a last-minute attempt to enshrine explicit 
minority rights in the final version. Hungary’s proposal triggered an instant negative response from the 
Slovak and Latvian governments but the final amendments, tabled by the Italian Presidency, included 
a prominent reference to the ‘respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minority groups’.
96 When the negotiations resumed, this amendment remained unchanged and now 
forms part of Article I-2 of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, which was adopted at the European 
Council meeting in Brussels on 18 June 2004.
97 In the text ‘the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities’ are clearly characterised as a sub-category of human rights, and an explicit reference to 
‘national’ minorities is missing. Nevertheless, political and societal actors are bound to legitimise their 
demands with a reference to the newly declared ‘values’ of the European Union, and the new treaty 
formulation establishes greater coherence with the political Copenhagen criterion.  
The Race Discrimination Directive 2000/43/EC, once fully transposed into domestic legislation in all 
Member States, legally embeds the norm of ‘equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin’.
98 It arguably represents the EU’s furthest reaching ‘constitutional resource’ for minority-
sensitive policies.
99 Together with the Employment Directive of 2000 it forms part of the acquis. 
Therefore, its transposition into national legislation falls under the third Copenhagen criterion, which 
focuses on a country’s capacity to take on the obligations of the acquis. The transposition of the 
directives has been a gradual process in both old and new Member States, and to date the record of 
implementation has been mixed.
100 Moreover, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, now 
incorporated as Part 2 in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly singles out ‘membership of a national 
minority’ among the grounds of discrimination to be prohibited. As the related Article 22, stipulating the 
Union’s respect for ‘cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’, it would apply to any action of the EU 
institutions and the Member States when implementing EU law if the Charter becomes legally binding.  
At least three basic lessons can be drawn from the first wave of the EU’s eastward enlargement with 
a view to sustaining and reinforcing the momentum for minority rights inside the EU: first, despite—or 
because of—its evident shortcomings, the Commission’s monitoring exercise has underscored the 
importance of a regular and systematic review of minority issues. The anti-discrimination acquis, the 
European Parliament’s annual human rights reports, the Network of Independent Experts and a 
revamped Monitoring Centre in Vienna provide parallel avenues in this context. Secondly, the fact that 
the EU extensively drew on the Council of Europe and the OSCE during the accession monitoring 
demonstrates the need for more effective cooperation between these three actors.
101 The aim should be 
                                                      
95   ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and non-discrimination’. 
96    See the text of Article I-2 proposed by the Italian Presidency on 25 November 2003, CIG 52/03; see 
http://www.euitaly2003.it/EN/ConferenzaIntergovernativa/DocCIG2.htm 
97   CIG 73/04 (Annex 1), Brussels, 29 April 2004, and CIG 85/04, Brussels, 18 June 2004. 
98   See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf; Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000: 
OJ L 180, 19.07.2000. 
99    For a systematic discussion see Bruno de Witte, forthcoming. ‘The Constitutional Resources for an EU Minority 
Protection Policy’, in: Gabriel N. Toggenburg, (ed.), The Protection of Minorities and the Enlarged Union. The Way 
Forward, Budapest: LGI Books. For a related discussion of the future of minority protection in a supranational context 
see also Gabriel von Toggenburg’s introduction to the same volume. 
100   For a case-by-case overview of the gradual adoption of anti-discrimination norms and legislation by the accession 
countries, see European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs Unit D.4, 2003. Equality, Diversity and 
Enlargement. Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination in Acceding and Candidate Countries, Luxembourg: 
European Communities. 
101   Closer cooperation simultaneously raises the question of whether the EU is encroaching on the other two organisations. 
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to avoid the duplication of tasks and build on the respective strengths and expertise of each institution. 
The EU with its lack of a track record in the area of minority rights could provide the meeting-place for 
the other institutions (incl. NGOs). A ‘joint venture’ between the EU, the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE could pool and streamline the expertise in monitoring and legal or practical advice.
102 Thirdly, 
and most generally, the enlarged EU will be confronted with an even greater political, economic and 
cultural diversity. Public and political awareness of this diversity is a basis for a wider domestic and 
international debate about the objectives of the EU, the nature of European values, and the relationship 
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difficulties and commitment problems among some of its members. From 1 May 2004 onwards the majority of Council 
of Europe members are EU Member States. This overlap in membership confirms the image and role of the Council of 
Europe as a stepping-stone towards EU membership, but it also blurs the distinctions between both organisations. In the 
words of a Commission official, ‘we are like an elephant in the organisation, and it will be hard not to put our foot on 
others […]’; Author’s interview with a Commission official, DG External Relations, 19 February 2004. 
102   For further recommendations along these lines, see the Bolzano Declaration on the Protection of Minorities in the 
Enlarged European Union, Bolzano: European Academy and LGI, 1 May 2004. 